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Abstract 
Throughout the world every economic and socio-economic indicator has deteriorated. 
The so-called ‘real economy’ has been deeply contaminated by the most significant 
global financial crisis for seven decades. The ultimate extent and duration of this rampant 
degeneration and its longer-term political effects are unpredictable. What caused the 
crisis? This paper examines a range of suppositions made in theories which deny the 
possibility of financial asset market failure and identifies ways in which they contributed 
to the circumstances and actions which created the current crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION: - GENESIS 
The crisis, it seems, was triggered by a bursting housing bubble, principally but not 
exclusively, in the United States (US).  This lead not only to huge mortgage defaults but 
exposed immense levels of other ‘toxic’ assets (i.e. hugely overvalued complex 
composites of insecure mortgages, credit card and store loans, and other credit bricolage 
whose expansion had been encouraged by confidence in ever rising house prices). The 
result was enormous losses by financial institutions in many countries, not just in the US 
but mainly also, but not exclusively, in number of European countries, as financial 
liberalization had enabled the transnational buying and selling of these toxic assets.  
Outside of the US, international capital flows are predominantly in the greater Europe 
area and thus the international dispersion of toxic assets was not worldwide (Thompson, 
2008). Their geographical origin, however, was mainly in Anglo-American countries 
where consumption of goods and services had increasingly been maintained by the 
expansion of personal borrowing rather than by wages and salaries constrained or 
diminished by considerable outsourcing to China (or elsewhere) and by dilution of 
employee protection.  
 
In these countries there was “privatized Keynesianism” (Crouch, 2008). In place of a 
considerable portion of potential government spending, including investment - much of 
which could have been financed by curtailing the enormous tax privileges of the super-
rich (Toynbee and Walker, 2008) - the process was “privatized”. It relied on the credit-
based consumption of Anglo-American lower and middle-income families. In the UK, for 
example, between 1998 and 2007 the borrowing to personal income ratio rose by 48% 
(Barrel, Hurst and Kirby, 2008). During the same period this ratio fell marginally in 
Germany. In June 2008, the UK’s National Statistics Office reported that UK households 
in total now owe a higher portion of their income in debt than has been the case for any 
other developed economy at any point in history (Watson, 2008).  
 
But the collapsing housing bubble was neither a necessary nor a sufficient event to have 
created the current crisis. Periods of financial stress have not always been followed by 
recessions or even by economic downturns (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
Financial institutions with adequate reserves would have been able to withstand the 
shocks without restricting lending. But too many were over-exposed not only because of 
their careless acquisition of “toxic assets” but also as a result of: unwise and overly 
speculative activities; “light touch” regulatory de-emphasis on risk constraints, such as 
required reserve ratios; and the disgorging of immense amounts of cash as bonus 
payments. Although much media commentary on executive pay has focused on that of 
CEO’s in non-financial corporations, the pay of many ‘professionals’ in financial asset 
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markets (hereafter ‘financial markets’) was far greater. By one estimate, the top 20 hedge 
fund managers earned more in 2005 than all 500 CEO’s of the S&P 500 (Kaplan, 2008).1 
The ‘wages’ of the financial markets’ “ringmaster class” (Blair, 2008, p.2) were 
astronomical.  
 
Liabilities – often camouflaged by complex ‘innovations’ which many bankers and 
regulators apparently did not understand - were piled on very slender asset bases. Losses 
(known and unknown), exposure, and fear caused over-leveraged financial institutions to 
restrict lending to each other and to non-financial institutions who were also over-
leveraged because of the dividend and stock buy-back demands of financial markets 
leading to further declines in asset prices, creating more losses, more fragility – and so on.   
A vicious circle of deleveraging and capital rationing commenced creating a self-
reinforcing downward spiral in financial and other markets.  The full consequences, depth 
and duration of this ‘domino-effect’ are, as yet, uncertain.  
 
In theories which deny the possibility of market failure, and specifically financial market 
failure, this crisis was supposed to be impossible. The occurrence of minor deviations 
from ‘fundamental’ values and occasional localised speculative bubbles was sometimes 
acknowledged, but it was held that provided markets are uninhibited by government, or 
other ‘constraints’, self-correction and on-going growth were inevitable. Financial 
markets were deemed to be self-optimizing, accurately valuing assets and achieving 
optimal resource allocation. Disturbances were supposed to be always exogenous, never 
endogenous, and rapidly and effectively absorbed. Markets, it was said, move naturally 
towards an equilibrium state which is also the optimal state. In short, there was supposed 
to be a blissful conjunction of economic growth and public welfare.  
 
Contrary to these denials of the possibility of the failure of contemporary financial 
markets, financial markets have failed. This paper will consider three properties of 
financial markets which enabled that failure. 
 
1. FAILURE BY SIGNAL 
Rather than providing failure-avoiding information, financial markets create information 
which leads to market failure. 
 
A fundamental supposition of the theories which deny the possibility of market failure is 
that asset prices reflect effective analysis of the necessary information required to 
calculate the correct prices. Misguided or ill informed analysis by some individual buyers 
and sellers of financial assets are deemed possible but never on a sufficient scale to 
undermine the accuracy of the prices determined by the aggregate buying, selling, and 
holding. A financial market is conceived in market failure denying theories as an 
optimally efficient and effective discovery procedure for processing, concentrating, and 
concisely transmitting (via price signals) correct valuations of assets.    
 
There are a number of fundamental problems with this view of the epistemic capability of 
financial markets, namely: (a) the existence of uncertainty; (b) over-reliance on past 
experience; and (c) irrational analysis and actions. Even if it is supposed that financial 
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market activists always act rationally, market failure is still possible (Keynes, 1936; 
Minsky, 1992). However, that possibility is all the greater because there is extensive 
evidence of irrational analysis and actions by ‘investors’. 
 
Uncertainty: Consumption goods are valued on benefits to be immediately received, 
financial assets are valued on disparate (heterogeneous) expectations about the future 
whose content is never wholly predictable. Notions of asset valuation which neglect 
uncertainty imply no novelty, no effects of human reflexivity, and therefore no surprises. 
George Soros calls the denial of uncertainty in financial markets “absurd” (2003, p. 3).  
Frank H. Knight observes that: “contingency or ‘chance’ is an unanalyzable fact of 
nature” (1965, p. lxiii).  John Maynard Keynes states that: “our knowledge of the factors 
which will govern the yield of an investment some years hence is usually very slight and 
often negligible” (1936, p. 149).  In the real world “forecasting is difficult if it really is 
about the future” (McCloskey, 1991).  Uncertainty cannot be analyzed away. Choices 
made in real time are never made with complete information. Extensive and often 
significant unpredictable and unanticipated events occur. So, errors in valuations, which 
are based on expectations, will also be extensive and significant. In short, because of 
ineliminable ignorance of the future an optimum equilibrium is not consistently attainable. 
 
The notion of the unbiased determinacy of the future by financial markets is inflated to an 
even higher imaginary level by the claim that share prices are the discounted value of 
future cash flows or of expected future cash flows. The future is supposedly predictable 
with such certainty that future circumstances and future actions are known with such 
precision that all future cash flows, interest rates, and so forth are knowable, albeit not by 
individuals but by ‘the’ market,  and thus can be systematically discounted. Many 
textbooks and some scholarly journal articles provide unrealistic examples of a perfectly 
predictable world, knowable, indeed quantifiable, through discounted cash flow analysis. 
But such perfect knowledge, as King (1975) states, is that which “only God could 
provide”.  
  
Overreliance On Past Experience: Prior to current crisis, circumstances increasingly 
encouraged an over-optimistic view of the future based on past experience. World-wide 
there was a long period of relative stability. In the United States, for instance, up until 
and into 2008, only five quarters in the past twenty two years exhibited declines in GDP 
and those declines were small. Many economists spoke of the “Great Moderation” - the 
idea that financial systems and the global economy had become so stable and 
sophisticated that they were free of volatility (Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the 15 occasions on which there were first magnitude stock market 
crashes in the 20th century (Bruner and Carr, 2007),  the general trend in the later part of 
that century was  robustly upwards and many financial market activists had never “seen a 
world where almost all asset classes could swing widely in value” (Tett, 2008).  This 
reinforced beliefs that financial market valuations would continue to rise in value. 
Financial market valuations were increasingly self-created. Consequently, Alan 
Greenspan observes, people experiencing such lengthy growth or stability “are prone to 
excess” (2005). As in Keynes’s famous “beauty contest” analogy, market activists 
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anticipating the average, and in this context over-optimistic, and over-confident, opinion 
of future financial asset prices, drove those prices up ever further. 2
 
The exuberant view was also encouraged by widely employed asset pricing models, such 
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which predict that a permanent decline in 
fundamental volatility ultimately results in a permanent decline in financial market 
volatility (Campbell, 2005).  Even holders of financial assets who were wary of long-
term prospects had incentives to buy because they thought they could sell the assets in the 
short term to others (“the greater fools”) with more optimistic long-term beliefs. 
Optimism was also reinforced by the apparent rapidity of “corrections”. The severe over-
reaction to the .com exuberance did not have sustained major impacts in the ‘real’ 
economy. Interest rates were quickly reduced, the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management was rapidly rescued in 1998, and the general upward rise in share prices 
soon returned.  
 
But ultimately over-optimism is not durable, it pushes markets towards instability 
(Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 1992). Instability is endogenous to financial markets. The rosy 
view reduced risk premia and encouraged ever more leverage and speculation. Instead of 
tempering that excess and providing sober assessment, financial markets were fuelled by 
excess and fuelled excess. 
 
Irrationality:  The emergence and inevitable collapse of unfettered speculative bubbles 
can be explained without depicting financial market activists as irrational. 
However, there is a long-standing and immense body of empirical studies demonstrating 
that financial markets are also characterised by irrationalities which further fuel the 
conditions and practices which ultimately lead to catastrophic destabilization. Identified 
irrationalities include: psychological contagion leading to irrational exuberance (Shiller, 
2000); herd mentality (Arthur, 2000); panics and over-reaction to prospects of losses 
(Campbell and Limmack, 1997); a range of seasonal and day-of-the-week patterns (Cho, 
Linton, and Whang, 2007; French, 1980; Pettengill, 2003; Keim and Stambaugh, 1984; 
Wang et al., 1997, and so on). At times, “massively confused investors” make 
“conspicuously ignorant choices” (Rashes, 2001). Whether study of these irrationalities 
can provide superior ‘investment’ strategies or not is not of concern here. What the 
findings demonstrate is that financial markets are not characterised by the rational 
signalling capability necessary to exclude the possibility of market failure.  
 
Although financial market valuations are not entirely at all times and in every instance 
determined by untethered emotions, rumours, and ignorance, financial markets do not 
have an endogenous ability to limit the effects of these characteristics and are thus not 
self-adjusting. Markets are ongoingly created by people, not by nature. The idea that 
financial markets always effectively price assets encouraged speculative purchasing in 
times of rising prices and contributed to the growth of speculative bubbles. It also 




2. FAILURE BY UNRESTRAINED PURPOSE  
 
Weakly regulated financial markets are unbalanced and encourage a lack of balance 
 
Speculative “bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise” do not necessarily become “the 
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (Keynes, 1936, p. 159) but in many countries 
financial markets which always contain elements of speculation became speculative 
markets. How was this possible?  
 
Financial market failure denial was the bedrock of two related processes over the past 
few decades: the hollowing-out of regulatory constraints and the domination of corporate 
governance policies by the notion of maximizing shareholder value. Both not merely 
enabled greater speculation but also encouraged it. 
 
De-regulation and Non-regulation: it has been argued that the crisis is not evidence of 
market failure but of the adverse consequence of ‘interference’ in markets. The President 
of the Czech Republic, which assumed the presidency of the European Union for the first 
half of 2009, for instance, states that “economic crisis should be regarded as an 
unavoidable consequence and hence a “just price” we have to pay for immodest and 
overconfident politicians playing with the market” (Klaus, 2009).  But the growth in 
massive speculative bubbles (in financial and other markets) occurred within an era of: 
(a) radical reduction in regulation3 -“light-touch” regimes; and (b) the growth of an ever-
larger portion of financial markets free of most regulations. At the end of 2007 roughly 
11,000 essentially unregulated, mainly unaudited, and largely off-shore domiciled hedge 
funds worldwide controlled about4 $2,250 billion in assets. The largest 3% of hedge 
funds accounted for three-quarters of total hedge fund assets in 2007 (International 
Financial Services London, 2008). The extent to which these regulatory changes occurred 
varied between countries, but everywhere the trend was towards dilution. Both changes 
were largely premised on a belief in the efficacy of ‘free’ markets. Although rarely 
directly ‘captured’ by specific financial institutions, too often regulators and the 
executive branch of governments, from which few regulators were effectively 
independent, were in thrall to an unreal and romanticised notion of markets and thus were 
‘captured’ by financial markets. Thus, rare interventions were largely aimed at 
reinforcing not correcting markets.  
 
An obsession with regulatory failure meant blindness about market failure as 
encapsulated in a famous statement by US president Ronald Reagan: “government is not 
the solution to our problem; government is the problem” (1981). Regulatory oversight 
was seen as the mere views of individuals inherently inferior to the mighty epistemic 
capability of markets. On the other hand, whatever individual market participants did was 
perceived to feed into that reified epistime and therefore to be beyond critique or 
questioning. Where it really mattered there was little oversight, in effect unregulating 
regulation which enabled and legitimated excess and ultimately led to failure. As the IMF 
recently observed, “economies with more-arm’s length or market-based financial systems 
seem to be particularly vulnerable to sharp contradictions in activity in the face of 
financial stress” (2008, p. xiii). The collapse and contamination began in the most 
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liberalized financial markets. Self-destruction not self-correction has been the outcome. 
An idealized system said to sustain and enhance “desirable” effects and to estop 
“undesirable” ones (Bator, 1958) has been revealed as one capable of disintegration and 
blighting of product and service markets. 
 
Shareholder Value: More than 70 years has not dimmed the topicality of the long-running 
debate first highlighted by Berle and Means (1932) about what should be the central 
purpose of corporations. But in the era of financial market de-regulation and non-
regulation, the idea that corporations (financial and non-financial) should be run with the 
primary, even exclusive, goal of maximizing the valuation of each corporation by 
financial markets – usually termed ‘maximizing shareholder value’ – came to dominate 
corporate governance regimes and wider aspects of the political economies first in Anglo-
American countries and increasingly in many other countries (Jürgens, Naumann and 
Rupp, 2000; Morin, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2007; Rose and Mejer, 2003).  
 
That purpose leads, it was said, to superior corporate and national economic performance 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  And through ‘trickle-down’, and other processes, 
everyone would benefit – the ‘rising tide would lift all boats’ (Sperling, 2007). Except in 
abnormal circumstances, the maximizing shareholder value norm is legally virtually 
unenforceable, even in Anglo-American countries. The Supreme Court in Delaware, for 
instance, a state in which the great majority of large US corporations have their legal 
headquarters, has frequently stated and implied that “there are few decisions not 
involving outright self-dealing [by management] that shareholders could enjoin boards 
from making” (Marens and Wicks, 1999, p. 280). For example, in Aronson v. Lewis 
[1984], the Court stated that “[a] cardinal precept of [Delaware law] is that directors, 
rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation”. The 
“business judgment rule” makes legal enforcement of maximizing shareholder value 
virtually legally unenforceable. Although it was not a legal requirement, the context 
became much more favourable to maximizing shareholder value from a period around the 
early 1980s. Increased pressures and demands were in part driven and legitimated by 
highly contestable analysis, including inaccurate (Sternberg, 1994) 5   definitions of 
property rights, and on partial and ahistorical data (Bugin and Copeland, 1997; 
Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001)  -  such that it became so widely accepted that many 
management (and other) textbooks simply assert, rather than argue for it (Bainbridge, 
2006; Sundram and Inkpen, 2004). According to Hansmann and Kraakman, writing in 
2001, “the triumph of the shareholder-orientated model of the corporation over its 
principal competitors is now assured”. 
 
The corner-stone of this theory is that as financial markets always accurately value 
corporations, then focusing the activities of corporations towards maximizing valuation 
by financial markets is the most effective form of ‘corporate governance’. For the current 
crisis, this narrowing of corporate purpose had a two-fold impact. It greatly encouraged 
speculative activity in financial markets but it also misdirected corporations such that 




Demands for share price growth, and relatedly large dividend payments (and/or share 
buybacks to boost share prices) encouraged corporations to increasingly rely on external 
funds, rather than retained profits, so their debt ratios grew along with their vulnerability 
to a credit crunch. Corporations were urged to rely on debt rather than internal funds. 
This was seen as yet another means to force companies to “disgorge” cash into financial 
markets (Jensen, 1989, p. 11). But as Alan Greenspan has observed: “Highly leveraged 
institutions … are by their nature periodically subject to seizing up as difficulties in 
funding leverage inevitably arise” (1999). Not every company de-emphasized “retain-
and-reinvest”, but many did and the degree of pressure and incentives to do so varied 
between and within countries (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
The desire for cash to feed financial markets drove extensive and persistent efforts to 
identify so-called ‘free cash flow’ through downsizing, de-layering, re-engineering, re-
structuring, and other actions (Ezzamel, Willmott and Worthington, 2008; Gaddis, 1997). 
Free cash not distributed to shareholders was said to be inefficiently used, to be wasteful. 
“For a company to operate efficiently and maximize value, free cash flow must be 
distributed to shareholders” (Jensen, 1989, p. 9). But often ‘waste’ cannot be readily 
distinguished from what is vital or enhancing. As Geroski and Gregg state: “it is very 
difficult to be sure whether overheads are ‘fat’ or ‘muscle’, particularly when some 
support services have subtle and potentially long-run effects on corporate performance” 
(1997, p. 14).  Identifying ‘free’ cash flow requires unavailable knowledge about the 
future.  To take an example, even if employees, say, are defined solely as an economic 
resource of, not stakeholders in, a corporation, would building affordable housing for 
some employees be a ‘waste’ of money which otherwise could have gone to shareholders 
(or top management), or would it increase morale and productivity thereby earning even 
greater cash? 
 
Relying on the contestable notion that a corporation’s sole responsibility is to its 
shareholders and on an impractical view of analytical capability,  Jensen, in a highly 
influential article,  argued that a corporation should only invest in “projects that have 
positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital” (1986, p. 323). 
With less precision Milton Friedman had already stated that: “there is one and only one 
social responsibility of business and that is to make as much money for shareholders as 
possible” (1970). A range of certainty assuming calculative techniques explicitly 
claiming to increase shareholder value - generically called ‘value based management, 
with proprietary names, such as Economic Value Added (EVA™), Total Business Return, 
Cash Flow Return on Investment, Economic Value Management, and Discounted 
Economic Profits were widely promoted by consultancy firms, lauded by some 
academics, and acquired by a significant number of  corporations. EVA™, said Fortune 
(1993), is “the real key to creating wealth ... it drives stock prices”.  
 
But it is overwhelmingly impossible in advance, and very often in retrospect, to identify a 
causal link between a micro-level decision within a corporation and shareholder value.  
This is evident both from the conceptual defects in the notion of accurately calculating 
the discounted cash flow of corporate projects - this can only be done in the very rare 
circumstances of no uncertainty - and also from empirical evidence. In fact, just about 
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every study of the application of discounted cash flow techniques within organizations 
points to the absurdity of seeking to side-line complexity and uncertainty (Bower, 1972). 
Independent studies of the degree of correlation of EVA™ (and other variants) with the 
absolute level of changes in stock market valuations of companies find it is at best 
miniscule and often negative (Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace, 1997). For instance, a study 
of 582 US companies found a correlation in only 18 companies. In 210 companies the 
correlation was negative (Fernádez , 2003). The extent to which value-based management 
programmes were heavily or lightly implemented varied (Francis and Minchington, 
2002), but there were real effects. The supposition of certainty in these programmes 
discouraged innovation – a profoundly uncertain process (Schilling and Hill, 1998). 
Wasteful investments were avoided but so too were productive ones. More corporate time 
was committed to satisfying financial markets with consequent reductions on attention to 
product and service markets (Dodd and Johns, 1999). 
 
Value based management schemes were part of a much wider and persistent search for 
cash extraction. CEOs benefited. In the US in 1980 average CEO pay was 42 times that 
of average worker pay, in 2006 it had rocketed to 364 times. Legitimating this has been 
the rise of an extensive literature and a wide array of university courses significantly 
overvaluing the role of CEOs as leaders (Khurana, 2002). But what happened to the cash 
“disgorged” into financial markets?  Participants in financial markets are usually referred 
to as ‘investors’. This implies that they are providing investment funds for corporations 
and thus have a vital role in resource allocation. The notion that shareholders 
‘investments’ are investment funds for corporations is reinforced in the description by 
corporations,  the media, and others  of various payments to shareholders such as 
dividends and share buybacks as: “giving back shareholders their money”, “returning 
cash to shareholders” (Rappaport and Maubossin, 2001). But that cash does not come 
from the shareholders. In fact, shareholders are overall at most a miniscule source of 
funding for corporations (O’Sullivan, 2000).6 The investments by shareholders in their 
own assets through purchase of shares from other shareholders (secondary market 
trading) is confused with investment in a corporation (primary market). Only a miniscule 
quantity of shares traded is new investment, overwhelmingly it is trade of shares in an old 
investment. In bull markets trading temporarily seems to boost economic growth simply 
by increasing activity in the market and increasing speculation. But the accumulation of 
private financial assets through financial markets does not lead to finance being 
channelled into productive activities. The error of assuming that old investment is new 
investment remarkably has misinformed a significant financial market failure denying 
literature (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, for instance). 
  
Increasingly, financial assets came to have, as it were, a life of their own. What occurred 
was what a number of commentators have called “financialization”: a “shift in the 
internal social relationships within states in favour of creditor and retainer interests, with 
the subordination of productive sectors to financial sectors” (Gowan, 1999, p. vii). In 
1980, world nominal gross domestic product and the value of world financial stocks were 
about the same size, by 2006 the latter had become three and a half times larger than the 
former (Huffschmid, 2008). As virtually all of the ‘investment’ activity in financial 
markets was not investment in productive activities, what emerged was in effect a giant 
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global casino, albeit less regulated than most casinos, and with profound consequences. 
As significant speculative bubbles are not conceivable by financial market failure 
denying theories, the general rise in market valuations created an illusion that the 
increasing values wholly reflected improved corporate achievements and prospects. 
Gambling begat more gambling. Institutional shareholders who did not participate 
enthusiastically often got “the cold shoulder” from pension funds and others (Thrift, 
2001).  As Keynes said about long-term investors “[if] he is successful, that will only 
confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, 
which is very likely, he will receive no mercy. Worldy wisdom teaches us that it is better 
for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” (1936, 158-9). 
Maximizing shareholder value, a massively influential idea, instead of being a “virtuous 
cycle” (Bughin and Copeland, 1997) turned out to be a driver of a vicious speculative 
cycle. 
 
3. INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION FAILURE 
 
Over powerful financial markets enable and induce both top management and financial 
market participants to behave myopically. 
 
A specific dilemma for financial markets is the balance between short-term cash 
extractions from a corporation against that corporation’s longer term investment 
requirements. Market failure occurs when a non-optimal balance between these different 
temporal orientations is not attained.  By supposing that financial markets are not myopic 
(Jensen, 1986; cf. Fuller and Jensen, 2002), financial market denial asserts that those 
markets either constrain corporations from sacrificing the longer-term through short-term 
focused but ultimately detrimental actions (such as costly inflations of the current bottom 
line or excessive dividend payments) or punish those few who briefly succeed. In that 
model, financial market pressure on corporations seeks only to eliminate undesirable 
investments and preserve and encourage worthy ones.  
 
Shareholders: This supposes that shareholders are committed to the longer term. Oliver 
Williamson states that they “invest for the life of a firm” (1985, p. 304). But this relies on 
a fictional characterization of shareholders as a group which collectively shares that 
commitment. Even if it is supposed that each individual shareholder has stable 
preferences regardless of time or context (a depiction which is not necessarily correct) 
shareholders in general have diverse and conflicting interests and preferences based on 
their differing attitudes, preferences, risk aversions, liquidity desires and needs, degrees 
of portfolio spread, and life circumstances (Crespi, 2007).  Shareholders relationships 
with a specific corporation may be very brief, and for many it often is. Each different 
generic conception of shareholders requires a different time-horizon to avoid market 
failure. The heterogeneous composition of shareholders debars an optimum framework 
and thus market failure is inevitable.  
 
Even shareholders with a longer-term horizon have an incentive to seek short-term 
benefits from a corporation even if it is potentially detrimental to the corporation in the 
longer-term (through reduced investment and thus lower future dividend paying ability) 
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as they have no guarantee that the corporation will actually invest sufficient of the higher 
retained profits/cash, or do so effectively, so as to bring about a future increase in 
dividend payments. 
 
The temporal influence of financial markets on corporations is conditioned by the 
specifics of national institutional contexts, albeit these are not deterministic and do not 
affect each company within the same country equally.   In contexts which readily enable 
hostile takeovers, for instance, the incentive to invest for the longer-term is reduced. The 
constraint placed upon investment is that distributed profits/cash-flow must be sufficient 
to satisfy shareholders’ demands and, moreover, high enough to ensure a strong share 
price which will discourage any attempt take over the corporation (Dickerson, Gibson 
and Tsakalotos, 1995).  
 
Chief Executive Officers: Intertemporal consumption problems with uncertain future 
gains also adversely affect the behaviour of corporate chief executive officers (CEO) and 
of other top management. Even in the absence of stock market based remuneration 
schemes, and most especially in deregulated contexts, CEOs have an incentive to 
emphasise the short-term because: (a) they can be certain about remuneration they 
currently take but uncertain about future remuneration; (b) in the short-term they are in 
control (notwithstanding the role of remuneration/compensation committees, which is 
largely cosmetic)(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003); and (c) in the longer term, given the normal 
age of appointment to CEO positions, they are retired. 
 
But the greatly increased use of stock option schemes7 linking of CEO, and other top 
management, remuneration with financial markets valuation of corporate stock has 
further intensified this short-term bias (Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006). As a 
practice, stock market incentive schemes for top management which begun in the US, 
came to dominate in Anglo-American countries and also spread elsewhere albeit not 
always as extensively. Legislative changes in 1998 in Germany, for instance, 
significantly facilitated the implementation of stock option plans (Langmann, 2007). In 
1980 stock options accounted for 19% of CEO remuneration in large United States 
corporations but it had risen to about 49% by 2000 (Lazonick, 2007. The logic of this 
‘agency cost’ view of corporate governance is that without such incentives top 
management are opportunistic (line their own pockets), risk adverse (hoard excessive 
cash or near-cash), empire or prestige builders, and/or reckless. These managerial 
activities are variously described as: ‘shirking’, ‘opportunism’, ‘moral hazards’, ‘vanity 
projects’, ‘tunnelling’, and ‘self-dealing’ (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2008). Directly linking significant portions of the payments (usually 
euphemistically called ‘compensation’) of top management with financial markets is 
supposed to channel them “away from extracting opportunistic rent and towards 
maximizing shareholder value” (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, and Yoder, 2007).  ‘Excess’ 
cash, for instance, could, it was argued be more efficiently reallocated by financial 
markets which would reallocate it to more productive purposes. The aim is “to motivate 
managers to disgorge the cash [to shareholders] rather than investing it at below cost or 
wasting it in organizational efficiencies” (Jensen, 1986, p. 33). Amongst other things, this 
eulogy of financial markets ignores the fact that available evidence suggests that 
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corporations which are not controlled by financial markets performed at least as well as 
those which are (Fligstein and Choo, 2005) and relies on the normative justification of 
favouring shareholders interests, at the expense of other stakeholders. 
 
What impact have these plans had on corporate performance and behaviour and what 
have been the consequences for financial market failure potential?  
 
Performance: Identifying the relationship(s) between CEO (and other top management) 
pay and corporate performance is rather elusive as corporate performance is multifaceted 
and not just a consequence of top management decisions. It is also created by the actions 
of others within and outside corporations and by circumstances beyond the control of top 
management. But based on a review of 220 studies, Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya 
(2003) found “few examples of systematic relationships” between stock ownership and 
corporate performance.  A meta-analysis of 137 CEO remuneration studies found that 
firm performance accounted for only 5% of the variance (Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-
Mejia, 2000). In 2007 average pay of top management of US public companies increased 
by 20.5% over 2006 earnings, but in the same period those corporations’ profits had, on 
average, increased by only 2.8% (Economic Research Institute, 2008). Froud et al. (2006) 
conclude that “top managers … appear to be an averagely ineffectual officer class who do, 
however, know how to look after themselves.” Stock options, Yermack (1995), states 
have often ironically been “not so much an incentive device but a covert mechanism of 
self-dealing” the very process they were supposed to eliminate.   
 
Behaviour: The general effect of stock market based incentive schemes has been to 
encourage short-term focused corporate decisions. Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy (2006), 
for instance, all found that such schemes motivate top management to emphasise short-
term stock market valuation at the expense of long-term corporate value both weakening 
corporate investment8 and increasing the speculative component in share prices. Sanders 
and Carpenter (2003) found that these schemes motivate top management to redirect 
funds away from long-term investments towards stock repurchases.  In 2005  Alan 
Greenspan in testimony to the US Federal Reserve Board observed that despite an 
exceptional rise in profits and cash flow investment lagged far behind such that the same 
configuration had last been seen in a deep recession in 1975. 
 
Stock options have in the main encouraged, and been encouraged by, speculative activity 
in financial markets and increased the vulnerability to the credit crunch of those 
companies which through pressure and/or choice emphasized the “disgorging” of cash. 
They have intensified management focus onto pleasing, and at times manipulating, 
financial markets. Inevitably this has diverted attention away from where real value is 
created - product markets (Ellsworth, 2002; Stinchcombe, 2000). The short-term 
speculative orientation of many CEOs when combined with the short-term and 
speculative orientation of shareholders mutually reinforce each other. 
  
Many factors have contributed to the liquidity problems currently being experienced by 
many corporations, not least a lending famine. However,  but years of excessive payouts, 
especially in shareholder value dominated economies, where so much cash has been 
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disgorged to satisfy the short-term demands of financial markets created an over-reliance 
on borrowings rather than retained profits for investment funds. In the 1970s, dividend 
payouts of US corporations averaged 41.3%, by 2007 it had increased to 66.2% (US 
Congress, 2009, Table B-90), but as share buybacks have also increased substantially the 
effective “disgorging” of cash by companies has been  even greater. 9  The false 
justification for this increased cash flow into financial markets is that these markets 
perform a vital resource (re)allocation role by identifying and investing in activities 
which have the best productive prospects. But as we have seen that cash is not recycled 
back into productive activities. Instead it was been a major reason the increase in highly 
leveraged, and thus vulnerable to credit famine, corporations and for the immense and 
almost continuous redistribution of income and wealth to the rich since the 1980s (Offer, 
2006; Toynbee and Walker, 2008). To enable this, the incomes of the non-elite have been 
constrained forcing ever more reliance on personal debt (Khoman and Weale, 2008)10 
and this inequality breeds instability (Keynes, 1936). 
 
National institutional contexts shape the level of, and changes in, retention rates. German 
corporations, for instance, pay out a lower portion of their cash flows than UK 
corporations (Andres, Betzer, Goergen and Rennebog, forthcoming).  Low retention rates 
have contributed to market failure in three ways. First, by encouraging and facilitating 
greater market speculation. Secondly, by increasing corporate vulnerability to a credit 
crunch. Thirdly, by driving-up personal debt. In the ‘developed world’ countries which 
on average have lower retention rates also have higher levels of personal debt. These also 
are the countries which a range of organizations predict will be most badly affected by 
the downturn and which will be slowest to recover (European Commission, 2008; 




Extensive financial market failure precipitated and continues to perpetuate widescale 
economic and social problems. This paper has sought to contribute to our understanding 
of the causes of the failure by examining three key failure enabling properties of financial 
markets.  
 
For decades financial market failure denial has become the root of inter-governmental 
policies and actions and many national governments. Financial markets were increasingly 
and extensively liberalised almost everywhere. Market failure denial is an idea which 
periodically re-emerges to dominate political meta-narratives and policies. The most 
recent phase began around the 1980s, first in Anglo-American countries, but increasingly 
it spread, with varying degrees of intensity around the world. Yet again, as a description 
of the capabilities and effects of financial markets it has proven to be wildly wrong and 
constitutive of a reality it claimed would not happen.  
 
Shifting the balance of governmental and corporate policy towards capital, and finance 
capital in particular, was justified on the grounds that everyone would benefit. The record 
shows that this was not the result (Brewster, Muriel, Phillips and Sibieta, 2008). It was 
also justified on a particularly narrow definition of the property rights of shareholders 
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(Stout, 2007).  Elaine Sterberg, for instance, stridently asserted that using the resources of 
a corporation for anything other than in the interests of shareholders is “theft: an 
unjustified appropriation of the owners’ property … That the diverted resources are 
applied to ends which are commonly regarded as laudable … does not make the act of 
diverting them any less larcenous” (1994, p.41).  And ‘theft’ indeed there was - but by 
finance capital not of finance capital. The consequences for many are already and will 
continue to be catastrophic. Only time will tell whether the concept of an economic 
holocaust is an accurate representation of what is to come. A weakening of speculative 
confidence in financial markets or of the supply of credit may cause economic collapse. 
The current crisis is a product of both combined. But as Keynes (1936, p. 158) observed 
about the last great crash, increasing credit availability (towards which much 
governmental activity is currently directed) though a necessary condition for recovery, is 
not a sufficient condition. 
 
Intellectual errors of monumental proportions have been made as a result of denial of the 
possibility of financial market failure. The academic literature is peppered with many 
examples of warnings about the dangers of financial market failure denial. But this was 
ignored. On the other hand there is an extensive academic literature which encouraged 
excessive and inappropriate de-regulation and was insufficiently alert to the speculative 
characteristics of financial markets. Inappropriate regulations can have detrimental 
consequences, but acknowledgement of regulatory failure does not require denial of 
market failure. And yet this denial shaped many actions towards, and within, financial 
markets. To paraphrase Keynes, governments believing themselves to be quite exempt 
from academic influence were usually the slaves of mistaken academics. Much of that 
literature is technically sophisticated but illustrative that even remorseless logic if it is 
premised with a mistake can end up promoting grave policy errors. 
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1 In the UK, it has been estimated that a pensioner with a private pension will pay out 
40% of their investment in fees over the lifetime of the investment (Manthorpe, 2008). 
 
2 Overconfidence is a frequently observed behavioural bias in psychological studies.  
 
3 In the US, for example, in 1999, after 12 attempts over 25 years, the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act which, based on the experience of the earlier great ‘Wall Street Crash’, had 
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prohibited commercial banks from “underwriting, holding or dealing in corporate 
securities, either directly or through securities affiliates” was revoked. In particular, 
Section 20 of the Act ordered that “no member bank could be affiliated with any 
corporation, association or business trust engaged principally in the issue, flotation, 
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail through syndicate 
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities” was replaced by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act which removed these 
firewalls. Amongst other effects, this allowed retail banks to engage in far riskier 
activities by levering up their bets, greatly increasing their vulnerability to illiquidity and 
helping to fuel the massive growth in exotic financial ‘innovations’.  The 1999 act also 
removed the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act’s separation of commercial banking and 
insurance business. In 2000 the Commodity Futures Modernization Act which shielded 
the market for derivatives from federal regulation became law (Akhigbe and White, 
2004; Canova, 2008; Kuttner, 2007). The Economist (1999), lauding the abolition of the 
act, stated that: “Glass-Steagall was a lousy law from day one ... accusations of 
disreputable practices and dishonest dealings made against the banks [are] not 
supported by any compelling evidence”.  For a similar view see Benston (1990). Since 
1993 European Union Second Banking Directive had already removed restrictions on 
retail banks engaging in “investment” activities (Benink and Benston, 2005). 
 
4 This may be an underestimate as determining the size of hedge funds is difficult 
because of the privacy which lack of regulation allows them. The  majority of hedge funds 
are domiciled off-shore  for tax avoidance, and other purposes, in the Cayman Islands. 
The next most popular registration locations are the British Virgin Islands and Bahamas. 
About two-thirds of onshore hedge funds are registered in the US state of Delaware 
(International Financial Services London, 2008). 
 
5  The property rights argument for shareholder primacy is that as a corporation 
“belongs” to its shareholders it should be run in a way that maximizes the benefits for its 
shareholders. Even if it supposed that a corporation is owned by its shareholders that 
would not exclude the rights of others, including, but not exclusively, those of bond 
holders (Black and Scholes, 1973). Property has legal (and moral) responsibilities, not 
just rights. But in any event, shareholders do not own a corporation. Rather they own a 
type of corporate security called “stock” or “shares” which gives them some, but not 
absolute, control over a corporation. For example, shareholders do not the right to 
exercise control over a corporation’s assets (Stout, 2007). 
 
6 Between 1970 and 1994 new shares contributed: +1%; + 3.5%; -4.6%; and – 7.6% of  
total new funding of  the non-financial sectors in Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and 
the United States respectively (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997).  See also: Ellworth, 2002 
and O’Sullivan, 2000. 
 
7 CEO and top management remuneration in addition to a fixed amount of pay may 
include: short-term bonuses, deferred retirement bonuses, stockholdings, stock bonuses, 
stock options, dividend units, phantom shares, pension benefits, saving plan 
contributions, and other items such as loans at below market rate. The most important 
item in terms of monetary gains, and the most controversial, are stock options 
(Constantinides, Harris and Stulz, 2003). 
 
 25
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Investment here means any increase in tangible or intangible assets including physical 
investment, training, R&D, etc. 
 
9 In 2006 the world’s biggest 600 companies bought back shares with the value 
equivalent of 78% of the dividends they paid in the same year (Financial. Times, March 
26, 2007). 
 
10 Absolute levels and increases in that ratio vary between countries. Within Europe, for 
instance it is particularly high in Ireland, Spain and the UK, but comparatively lower in 
Germany and France. 
